This paper analyses the sources of buyer power and its e¤ect on sellers' investment in quality improvements. In our model retailers make takeit-or-leave-it o¤ers to a producer and each of them obtains its marginal contribution to total pro…ts (gross of sunk costs). In turn, this depends on the rivalry between retailers in the bargaining process. Rivalry increases when the retailers are less di¤erentiated and when decreasing returns to scale in production are larger. The allocation of total surplus a¤ects the incentives of the producer to invest in product quality, an instance of the hold-up problem. An increase in buyer power not only makes the supplier and consumers worse o¤, but it may even harm the retailers, that obtain a larger share of a smaller surplus. A repeated game argument shows that e¢ cient quality improvements can be supported as an equilibrium outcome if producer and retailers are involved in a long-term relationship.
Introduction
In the last decades, the retailing sector -in particular grocery retailing -has experienced a movement towards increased concentration. Broadly speaking, large retail chains and multinational retail companies (such as Wal-Mart, Carrefour, the Metro group) now play a dominant role, even though the phenomenon is not uniform across countries. 1 At the EU level, retailer concentration is further strengthened by purchasing alliances (operating nationally or cross-border such as Euro Buying or Buying International Group). Buyer power is on the rise also in other industries, such as automobile, 2 healthcare and cable television (in the US). 3 These trends have triggered investigations by anti-trust agencies and policy institutions around the world on the e¤ects of increasing buyer power. 4 One concern that is often expressed is that excessive buyer power may deteriorate suppliers' incentive by squeezing their pro…t margins and thus indirectly harm consumers and overall welfare. For instance, according to the FTC report, "even if consumers receive some bene…ts in the short run when retailers use their bargaining leverage to negotiate a lower price, they could be adversely a¤ected by the exercise of buyer power in the longer run, if the suppliers respond by under-investing in innovation or production" (FTC 2001, p.57) .
In this paper we formalize this argument by studying the impact of buyer power on a supplier's incentive to improve quality.
Our model assumes a monopolistic producer and two independent retailers. First, the supplier chooses to improve the (non-contractible) quality of its product through a sunk investment. Higher quality makes …nal consumers more willing to pay for the good, thereby increasing total industry pro…ts (gross of sunk costs). Af- 1 For example, in the UK supermarkets accounted for 20% of grocery sales in 1960, but 89% in 2002, with the top-5 stores controlling 67% of all sales. France exhibits similar features. In other countries, such as Italy and the US, small independent retailers still retain a strong position in the market, although their position has eroded over time. Moreover, in the US the supermarket industry is experiencing an unprecedented merger wave. For an overview of recent changes in the retail sector see Dobson and Waterson (1999) , Dobson (2005) and OECD (1999). 2 The increased bargaining power of automakers when negotiating with parts suppliers is documented, among the others, by Peters (2000) . 3 In cable television, the concern of excessive buyer power of MSO (multiple system operators) is one of the reasons why the FTC has enforced legal restrictions on their size. See Raskovich (2003) and Chae and Heidhues (2004) . In the healthcare sector, buyers (drugstores, hospitals and HMOs) aggregate into large procurement alliances in order to reduce prescription drug costs. See Ellison and Snyder (2002) and DeGraba (2005) . 4 The growing concern about buyer power is documented in the Symposium on Buyer Power and Antitrust, Antitrust Law Journal (2005) . See also Dobson and Waterson (1999) , Rey (2000) and the reports by OECD (1999), FTC (2001) , EC (1999) .
ter the quality decision, supply conditions are determined in bilateral negotiations. While most of the literature on buyer power employs speci…c cooperative solution concepts, we explicitly specify a non-cooperative bargaining protocol. This allows us to precisely identify how fundamentals (preferences and technology) a¤ect buyer power. We consider the simplest bargaining setting in which buyer power and its sources can be analyzed. In particular, we assume that retailers make (simultaneous) take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to the producer, with no restrictions on the type of contracts that can be o¤ered.
The solution of the negotiation game -given the quality choice -provides the following insights. Firstly, in equilibrium total industry gross pro…ts are maximized. This is obtained, absent any restriction on contractual forms, as an outcome of the negotiation process. Secondly, total industry pro…ts are distributed so that each retailer receives its marginal contribution, i.e. the additional surplus created when one more retailer is supplied. In turn, retailers'marginal contribution is determined by demand and supply conditions. Let us consider …rst the demand channel. If retailers are perceived as perfectly substitutable by …nal consumers (because there is neither geographical di¤erentiation nor di¤erentiation in the provision of sale services), the maximum industry pro…t can be achieved by supplying one retailer only. Hence, the marginal contribution of each retailer is zero, and the supplier appropriates the entire surplus from the negotiation, even though retailers make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers. Di¤erently stated, this case exhibits the strongest rivalry among retailers in the negotiation with the supplier. As retailers'di¤erentiation increases, their marginal contribution increases as well (and rivalry weakens). Thus, the share of total pro…ts they absorb in the negotiation increases.
The second source of rivalry comes from the supply channel, through the convexity of the producer's cost function. With an increasing marginal cost curve the two retailers compete for the productive resources of the supplier. If a retailer increases its sales, it causes an increase in the marginal cost incurred to supply the other retailer, and therefore reduces the marginal pro…ts created by the latter. A steeper marginal cost curve enhances this "congestion" e¤ect.
We then analize the quality choice made by the producer. Buyer power, by reducing the share of total pro…ts that the supplier extracts from the negotiation, weakens the producer's incentive to engage in quality improvement, an instance of the hold-up problem. Hence, it makes both the producer and …nal consumers worse o¤. Furthermore, we identify conditions under which an increase in buyer power turns out to harm also the retailers, because the "smaller-cake e¤ect" dominates the "larger-slice" one.
Finally, we show that repeated interaction may induce the producer to choose the e¢ cient quality level even in the presence of powerful buyers.
Related literature This paper relates to the growing literature on buyer power. This literature has addressed three main issues: (i) why larger buyers obtain better deals from sellers; (ii) whether wholesale discounts obtained by large buyers are passed on to …nal consumers; (iii) what are the implications of buyer power for suppliers'incentives.
The literature exploring the sources of buyer power is very heterogeneous. 5;6 In a number of papers, size discounts arise because large buyers are better bargainers than small ones. This occurs for various reasons. Larger buyers can distribute the costs to generate alternative supply options over a larger number of units. This makes their threat to integrate backwards credible and improves their bargaining position with the supplier (Katz, 1987; Inderst and Wey, 2005b) . In Inderst and Sha¤er (forthcoming) a consolidated retailer may commit to stock only one variety at all outlets, thereby intensifying competition among potential suppliers. In other papers, including Chipty and Snyder (1999) and Wey (2003, 2005a) , the e¤ect of buyer size on bargaining is more subtle. To see the point, consider a supplier which bargains separately and simultaneously with a small and a large buyer. Each buyer views itself as marginal, conjecturing that the other has completed its negotiation with the supplier e¢ ciently. Hence, the incremental surplus over which the supplier and a buyer negotiate is computed assuming that the producer already supplies the other buyer. Since negotiation with the small buyer involves a smaller quantity, the incremental surplus associated to the large buyer is computed considering a smaller quantity as a starting point. If aggregate surplus across all negotiations is concave in quantity, it follows that the incremental surplus from the negotiation involving the large buyer is higher per-unit than the incremental surplus from the transaction involving the small one. This higher per-unit incremental surplus translates into a lower per-unit price for the large buyers. The aggregate surplus function is concave, for instance, if the supplier has (strictly) convex production costs. 5 Heterogeneity arises because there exists no single canonical formalization of the exchange between upstream and downstream …rms. In particular, models di¤er for the assumptions on the class of contracts that …rms can o¤er and on the bargaining procedure. 6 See Snyder (2005) for a recent survey. For empirical and experimental evidence documenting the existence of buyer-size e¤ects, see Scherer and Ross (1990, pp. 533-35) , the summary in Ellison and Snyder (2002) and Normann, Ru-e and Snyder (2005) .
We contribute to this literature emphasizing that buyer power is determined by the extent to which a buyer is essential to the creation of total surplus. In turn, this depends on buyers'size but also on demand and supply conditions. In particular, the demand channel has been scarcely explored so far.
In another strand of the literature, size discounts emerge because larger buyers destabilize collusion. For instance, a larger buyer, by accumulating a backlog of un…lled orders, may mimic a demand boom and force sellers to collude on lower prices (Snyder, 1996) . Instead, in Tyagi (2001) it is the supplier which has incentives to o¤er lower prices to larger buyers in order to amplify cost asymmetries among downstream …rms and undermine collusion in the …nal market.
Finally, buyer power may originate from risk aversion, as shown by Chae and Heidhues (2004) and DeGraba (2005) .
The literature which studies the welfare e¤ects of buyer power is less abundant. Most of the papers address the question of whether lower wholesale prices secured by powerful buyers imply lower …nal-good prices or higher welfare and show that this is not necessarily the case. 7 For instance, Von Ungern-Sternberg (1996) and Dobson and Waterson (1997) show that price discounts obtained by more concentrated buyers translate into lower …nal-good prices only if downstream …rms compete …ercely in the …nal market (e.g. because product di¤erentiation is low) and thus double marginalization is not severe. 8 Chen (2003) shows that an exogenous increase in the relative bargaining power of a dominant retailer bene…ts consumers because it triggers a decrease in the wholesale price charged by the supplier to the fringe competitors, thereby leading to lower …nal prices. In spite of this, total welfare may decrease because more production is allocated to the less e¢ cient fringe competitors. Only recently, some papers have begun to examine the impact of buyer power on the suppliers'incentives to invest and innovate. 9 Inderst and Sha¤er (forthcoming) and Chen (2006) con…rm the aforementioned concerns and show that buyer 7 Note that, in order to study this issue, these papers rule out the possibility to o¤er e¢ cient vertical contracts, i.e. contracts that allow to maximize aggregate pro…ts. Indeed, if e¢ cient contracts were feasible, increased concentration in the downstream market would have no impact on …nal prices because total industry pro…ts would always be maximized, irrespective of the structure of the downstream market. 8 In these papers, a merger between two buyers corresponds to one …rm vanishing from the market. The remaining …rms continue being symmetric so that they evaluate the impact of an increase in downstream concentration, not the impact of the formation of a larger buyer. 9 Di¤erently from the previous ones, these models allow for su¢ ciently complex vertical contracts so that aggregate pro…ts are always maximized. The structure of the downstream market a¤ects only the distribution of surplus between upstream and downstream …rms. This allows to isolate the e¤ect of increased concentration in the downstream market on suppliers'incentives from the e¤ect on …nal prices and quantities, and to focus only on the former. power may decrease welfare through a distortion in the variety of products o¤ered to consumers. Speci…cally, in Inderst and Sha¤er (forthcoming) manufacturers anticipate that a consolidated retailer will stock only one product at all outlets, and choose an ine¢ cient type of variety in order to …t "average" preferences. In Chen (2006) , a more powerful retailer induces a monopolist manufacturer to reduce the number of varieties o¤ered to consumers, thereby exacerbating the distortion in product diversity caused by upstream monopoly. We show that buyer power may lead also to quality deterioration.
By contrast, Inderst and Wey (2003 , 2005a , 2005b ) and Vieira-Montez (2004) challenge the view that the formation of larger buyers will invariably sti ‡e investment by upstream …rms. Indeed, downstream mergers may strengthen suppliers' incentives to invest in capacity or to adopt technologies with lower marginal costs, thereby raising consumer surplus and total welfare. For instance, in Inderst and Wey (2005b) , in the presence of a large buyer -which di¤erently from small ones can credibly threaten to integrate backwards -the supplier bene…ts more from a reduction in marginal costs. Such a reduction makes the supplied …rms more e¢ cient so that, in case of backward integration, the large buyer will face tougher competitors. This reduces the large buyer's outside option and allows that supplier to extract more surplus when negotiating with it. Inderst and Wey (2003 and 2005a) suggest a di¤erent mechanism. When negotiating with fewer but larger buyers, the supplier can roll over more of "inframarginal" but less of "marginal" costs. Hence, the presence of a large buyer makes the supplier more willing to choose a technology with lower incremental costs at high quantities. This paper relates to the literature on the hold-up problem, dating back to Klein et al. (1978) and Williamson (1979) . This literature typically studies whether vertical integration (involving investing-parties) alleviates the problem (see for instance, Hart, 1989 and Moore, 1990 ). Instead our model studies the impact of fundamentals (preferences and technology) on the severity of the hold-up problem, through their e¤ect on rivalry among retailers in the negotiation with the producer.
The plan of the paper is the following. Section 2 presents the basic model and the negotiation stage. Section 3 studies the quality choice of the producer and how this choice is a¤ected by rivalry between downstream …rms. Section 4 discusses the robustness of the basic model and some extentions. Finally, Section 5 studies the case where the producer and retailers interact repeatedly.
Basic Model
We assume a monopolistic upstream supplier, or "producer" (denoted as P ). To …x ideas we suppose that in the downstream market the product is distributed to …nal consumers, and there are two independent retail outlets, or "downstream …rms" (denoted as D 1 and D 2 ).
The timing of agents'decisions is the following:
At time t 0 the producer chooses the quality level X of its product. Quality is not contractible. Quality chosen at time t 0 has commitment value.
At time t 1 retailers make simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to the producer.
At time t 2 production takes place and the good is distributed in the …nal market.
For simplicity we assume that retailing does not involve additional costs. This is equivalent to assuming (more realistically) that retailers face a constant marginal cost (constant returns to scale). Revenues of retailer D i are given by a function R i (q 1 ; q 2 ; X), which is assumed to be continuous, strictly concave in q i , weakly decreasing in q j and null for q i = 0. All these assumptions are satis…ed by the structural speci…cation considered later on.
The production technology is summarized by a (weakly) convex cost function C(Q) such that C(0) = 0. This cost does not include sunk costs incurred to attain quality X. For notational simplicity we will omit X whenever this causes no confusion. Also, without substantial loss of generality, we assume that retailers' revenue functions are symmetric, and we write R(q 0 ; q 00 ; X) := R 1 (q 0 ; q 00 ; X) = R 2 (q 00 ; q 0 ; X).
Negotiation stage
To compute the (e¢ cient) subgame perfect equilibrium outcome we …rst examine the subgame starting at date t 1 . At date t 2 (in a subgame perfect equilibrium) the producer simply maximizes its payo¤ as determined by the accepted contracts, all the interesting action takes place at date t 1 . We therefore refer to the subgame starting at date t 1 simply as the "negotiation stage". In most of the literature, bargaining between the supplier and the retailer(s) is solved adopting a speci…c cooperative solution concept. Instead, we explicitly specify a non-cooperative bargaining protocol. The assumption that retailers make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers does not imply that they can always appropriate the entire surplus associated to the negotiation. Therefore, this assumption allows us to study situations where the retailer's bargaining power changes as a function of the fundamentals, such as technology and the degree of substitutability between retailers.
A relevant benchmark in the analysis of negotiation is whether the …rms adopt e¢ cient contracts, i.e. contracts that allow to maximize industry pro…ts. We emphasize that the selection of e¢ cient contracts is a result of our analysis, not an assumption, since …rms are free to propose any kind of contract. In general, we allow for nonlinear contracts whereby the payment to the supplier by one retailer depends on the quantity sold to both retailers (and re-sold by them on the downstream market). 10 In particular, we also allow retailers to o¤er exclusive contracts where the supplier commits not to sell the product to the rival retailer (an exclusive contract is a contract that in ‡icts a su¢ ciently high penalty to the producer if it sells a positive quantity to the rival retailer). Exclusive contracts play an important role in deriving the essential uniqueness of the equilibrium outcome in the negotiation stage (see the proof of Proposition 1). For concreteness, although we allow any nonlinear contract, we often focus our attention on equilibrium contracts where retailer i pays back to the producer the revenue R i (q 1 ; q 2 ) collected and the supplier pays to retailer i a …xed amount (slotting allowance) S i . Our negotiation stage is similar to a "menu auction" in the sense of Bernheim and Whinston (1986), with P playing the role of the "auctioneer" and D 1 and D 2 playing the role of the "bidders". 11 We postpone the discussion of this point until after the main result of this subsection.
We let e denote the pro…t (gross of sunk costs) of a vertically integrated monopolist, and let denote the pro…t of an integrated …rm who operates only 10 See Villas-Boas (2005) and Bonnet et al. (2005) for empirical evidence documenting that manufacturers and retailers use non linear pricing contracts. 11 Bernheim and Whinston assume that the set of possible choices of the "auctioneer" (P in our case) is …nite, whereas in our case it is a continuum. Furthermore, the option of not accepting an o¤er is not explicitly modeled in their framework. The following version of the negotiation stage can be seen as a special case of their framework: (i) (q 1 ; q 2 ) is chosen from a …nite grid G R 2 + containing (0; 0), (ii) P does not have the option of explicitly rejecting o¤ers, but each contract o¤er t i (q i ; q j ) has to satisfy the constraint t i (0; q j ) = 0, so that choosing q i = 0 is equivalent to rejecting i's o¤er. If G is su¢ ciently …ne, such model is essentially equivalent to ours. one retailing outlet:
= max
We assume that (1) and (2) have unique solutions (by symmetry, the solution of (1) must have q 1 = q 2 ).
Remark 1 Under the stated assumptions 2 e 0.
Proof. Let q be the solution to problem (1) . Then
where the …rst inequality follows from the convexity of C( ) and C(0) = 0, and the last inequality follows from the assumption that R( ; ) is weakly decreasing in its second argument.
Following Bernheim and Whinston (1986) we say that an equilibrium is coalitionproof if there is no other equilibrium where both retailers obtain a strictly higher pro…t. The following proposition says that there is a continuum of equilibrium payo¤ allocations, but in every coalition-proof equilibrium each downstream …rm D i gets its marginal contribution to industry surplus, that is, the di¤erence between maximum industry surplus e and the maximum surplus obtainable without D i ; the producer P obtains the rest of the maximum industry surplus.
Proposition 1 In the negotiation stage, (1) the maximum equilibrium payo¤ of each retailer is D i = e , the minimum equilibrium payo¤ of the producer (gross of sunk costs) is P = 2 e , and the maximum equilibrium payo¤ is P = ;
(2) for each P 2 [2 e ; ] there is an "e¢ cient"equilibrium where the producer obtains P and each retailer obtains 1 2 ( e P ); (3) there is a unique coalitionproof equilibrium allocation where each retailer obtains the marginal contribution e and the producer obtains 2 e .
Proof. A strategy pro…le in the subgame is given by a pair of contract o¤ers (t 1 ; t 2 ) (with t i : R 2 + ! R) and a strategy of the producer that speci…es which contracts should be accepted and, for each set of accepted contracts, a pair of quantities (q 1 ; q 2 ), where q i = 0 if t i is rejected. A strategy of the producer is sequentially rational if (a) for each set of accepted contracts (q 1 ; q 2 ) maximizes P 's pro…t, and (b) P accepts or reject contracts so as to obtain the highest maximum pro…t. We will only consider sequentially strategies of P and focus on the retailers' incentives.
(1) We …rst show that D i e in equilibrium. Consider a strategy pro…le that yields payo¤s P , D j and D i > e . The latter inquality implies that P accepts D i 's o¤er. By sequential rationality, P is at least as high as the maximum payo¤ P can achieve by accepting only D i 's o¤er.
follows that P + D j < . Therefore D j can o¤er an exclusive contract of the form t 0 j (q j ; 0) = R(q j ; 0) S where D j < S < P . The contract (if accepted) yields payo¤s
Faced with such an o¤er, P accepts at most one contract. If only i's contract is accepted, the payo¤ is at most P . Therefore P would accept D j 's exclusive contract t 0 j , which implies that D j has a pro…table deviation.
Next we show that P cannot get less than 2 e in equilibrium. Consider a strategy pro…le inducing payo¤s D i , D j , and P < 2 e . Let (wlog)
. Suppose that D i o¤ers instead an exclusive contract of the form t 0 i (q i ; 0) = R(q i ; 0) S, where S = P ". This contract (if accepted) implements the payo¤s P + " for P and P " for D i . By assumption " can be chosen so that 0 < " < h 2 e P i =2. Then P accepts t 0 i (otherwise he gets at most P ) and it can be checked that
; thus D i has a pro…table deviation. Now consider a strategy pro…le such that P > , which implies that P …nds it optimal to accept both o¤ers t 1 and t 2 . Then each retailer D i has a pro…table deviation t 0 i t i ", where 0 < " < P . To see this, note that if P accepts t 0 i and t j its payo¤ is P " > , and if P rejects t 0 i its payo¤ it at most . (2) Consider the following strategy pro…le:
t 2 is symmetric to t 1 , P accepts both contracts, and P is sequentially rational in the choice of (q 1 ; q 2 ) for every set of accepted contracts. It can be checked that this is an equilibrium. P is indi¤erent between accepting both contracts or only one: in both cases the payo¤ is P 2 e 0. In the candidate equilibrium each retailer gets 1 2 ( e P ) 0 and cannot obtain more by deviating to an alternative contract t 0 i . To see this note that P would accept t 0 i only if it gets at least P , which is the payo¤ of accepting only t j . If P accepts only t 0 i then D i gets at most P . Since P 2 e , P
( e P ). If P accepts both t 0 i and t j then D i gets at most e P 1 2 (1), there is no other equilibrium where both retailers get a strictly higher payo¤. Therefore this equilibrium is coalition-proof, and every other coalition proof equilibrium is payo¤-equivalent to this one.
The equilibrium strategy pro…le put forward in part (3) of the proof above is an example of "truthful equilibrium" in the sense of Bernheim and Whinston (1986) , who work in a more abstract framework. Bernheim and Whinston show that all truthful equilibria are e¢ cient and coalition-proof, and that coalition-proof equilibrium payo¤s can be implemented by truthful equilibria. A similar result holds for the negotiation stage of our model. The speci…c structure of our "menu auction" allows us to obtain uniqueness of coalition-proof equilibrium payo¤s. 13 The equilibria of part (2) of the proof are e¢ cient and "locally truthful" (Grossman and Helpman, 1994) . In these equilibria the producer cannot fully appropriate the gross surplus e and therefore in the quality choice stage they typically give rise to a form of the hold-up problem, although not as severe as with the marginalcontribution equilibrium payo¤ selected by the coalition-proofness criterion. From now on we apply the coalition-proofness criterion.
Next we consider a structural speci…cation of the revenue and cost functions, and solve the model backward.
Downstream …rms' s rivalry and quality choice
In this Section we analyze quality choice in various market settings, that are characterized by di¤erent levels of rivalry of the downstream …rms when bargaining with the producer. The main features of the model are the impact of quality on demand and costs and the channels through which rivalry in the bargaining stage depends on market and technology fundamentals. More speci…cally, in our setting quality improvements entail sunk costs and enhance consumers'willingness to pay, while the degree of rivalry between retailers in the bargaining stage depends on …nal demand substitutability and the steepness of the marginal costs of production.
We describe the model starting from the supply of the product and then moving to the demand for the good distributed by the two retailers.
Producer P supplies a single good, whose baseline quality is X 0 . Quality improvements above the baseline level entail sunk costs according to the following expression:
with > 2, 14 where X is the chosen quality. Variable costs of production are quadratic:
where k is a parameter inversely related to decreasing returns to scale. The lower k, the steeper the marginal costs: we shall show later on that this implies a more intense rivalry of the retailers in the bargaining stage, when they compete for the productive resources of the supplier.
Moving to the demand side, the preferences of a representative consumer are described by the following utility function:
where q 1 and q 2 are the quantities of the good sold by the two retailers and y is the expenditure in the outside good. 15 It is evident from the expression above that the higher the quality X, the higher the utility from consumption of the good. Moreover, the sales of the good realized by the two retailers (q 1 and q 2 ) are (horizontally) di¤erentiated, for instance due to di¤erent locations of the outlets. From this utility function we can derive the inverse demand functions:
with i = 1; 2 and 2 [0; 1] : This latter parameter describes the degree of substitutability of the two retailers. If = 0, they operate in independent markets, i.e. there is no substitution between the two sales. Conversely, if ! 1; the …nal consumers view the two goods as perfectly homogeneous. A convenient property of this demand system is that, for given prices and quality, aggregate demand and consumers' surplus do not vary with the degree of substitutability . To show this, the demand functions are:
Aggregate demand, therefore, is equal to:
and is independent of : In other words, for given prices and quality the dimension of the …nal market (and the consumers'and total surplus) does not depend on the di¤erentiation of the two retailers. The parameter , therefore, can be interpreted as a pure measure of the rivalry between the two retailers in the bargaining process with the supplier: when we shall apply Proposition 1 to this model, it will turn out that in ‡uences only the allocation of surplus between the producer and the retailers, but not total surplus. If = 0; rivalry is nil, while the case ! 1 corresponds to maximum rivalry of the two retailers.
In order to apply Proposition 1 we now turn to computing total gross pro…ts e when both retailers are active, and gross pro…ts when only one retailer serves the …nal market. e is obtained by solving the following program:
The FOC's :
for i; j = 1; 2, i 6 = j, yield:
(e q 1 ; e
Note that e is increasing in X and in k (and does not depend on ):
The gross pro…t when only one retailer is active, , is obtained from:
The FOC is given by:
Hence, q = Xk(1 + ) 4k + + 2k + 1 and (q; 0) = 1 2
According to Proposition 1, the producer's pro…t (gross of the cost of the investment in quality) is given by:
= e P where P = + 2k + 1 4k + + 2k + 1 is the producer's share of total pro…ts e : The retailer's pro…ts are:
The producer's share of total pro…t is increasing in and decreasing in k :
This result allows to understand how demand substitutability and the steepness of the marginal cost curve in ‡uence the bargaining outcome. Recall that each retailer will obtain in equilibrium, as the outcome of the bargaining process, the incremental pro…ts that are generated by moving from one to two retailers, i.e. its contribution to the creation of the overall pro…ts. Marginal contributions, in turn, depend on both the demand substitutability parameter and the decreasing returns parameter k.
When the degree of di¤erentiation between the two retailers decreases (i.e. increases), the incremental pro…ts generated by each individual retailer fall, reducing the share of total pro…ts that can be kept in equilibrium. In the limit, with perfectly homogeneous retailers ( ! 1), all the surplus is captured by the producer. Notice that the decreasing contribution of each retailer to total pro…ts as demand substitutability increases does not depend on the fact that horizontal rivalry in the …nal market increases, leading to lower prices and pro…ts: the retailers, in fact, will adopt in any case e¢ cient contracts, as proved in Proposition 1, that maintain the overall pro…ts at the level of the vertically integrated solution. However, when the retailers are more similar (higher ), each one is less essential in the creation of total pro…ts, and each one can be replaced with minor losses by the rival.
Moving to the supply side rivalry channel, with increasing marginal costs the two retailers compete for the productive resources of the supplier. The marginal cost to produce and sell in one market depends on the amount produced and sold in the other market. Hence, if a retailer increases its sales, it causes an increase in the marginal cost incurred to supply the other retailer, and therefore reduces the marginal pro…ts created by the latter. Hence, an expansion in one retailer's sales reduces the other retailer's ability to extract surplus from the producer in the bargaining stage. An increase in k, making the marginal cost ‡atter, reduces this "congestion" e¤ect in production and therefore reduces the producer's share of total pro…ts. In the limit, with ‡at marginal costs (k ! 1) the supply side rivalry channel vanishes.
We can now consider the optimal choice of quality by the producer in the initial stage:
A simple inspection of this maximization problem reveals that, since P < 1; the supplier will choose a level of quality lower than the one that maximizes total pro…ts e (X) (X X 0 ) : this result reminds the well know hold-up problem and the associated distortions in the level of investment. The reduction in quality is less severe the higher the share of total pro…ts P obtained by the producer, i.e. the stronger is rivalry of retailers in the bargaining process. Hence, the producer invests more in quality improvements as the degree of substituability of retailers increases. This result and its implications are illustrated by the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 (Impact of demand-side rivalry) (1) The equilibrium quality is increasing in the degree of substitutability of retailers . (2) Consumers' surplus, producer's pro…ts, total pro…ts and total welfare are increasing in : (3) When k is su¢ ciently large, retailers'pro…ts are increasing in for low levels of :
Proof. See Appendix A. Recall that with e¢ cient contracts the level of output is always at the (integrated) monopoly level, for any value of : Thus, the e¤ect of on consumers does not originate from a reduction of …nal prices. Consumers are better o¤ when retailers' substituability increases because the hold-up problem becomes less severe and quality increases. Similarly, the aggregate pro…ts of the vertical chain do not depend directly on : Still, they increase as the degree of substitutability increases through the indirect e¤ect on quality. As for the producer, its pro…t is increasing in because it obtains an increasing share of aggregate (gross) profits. All this implies that total welfare increases in the degree of substitutability between retailers.
Instead, an increase in has two opposite e¤ects on the retailers'pro…ts. Aggregate (gross) pro…ts increase but a lower share of these pro…ts is appropriated by the retailers. It can be shown that when k is su¢ ciently large the retailers'pro…ts increase in for low degree of substitutability. In this case not only demand-side rivalry but also supply-side rivalry is very low, since marginal costs of production are almost ‡at. Hence, the producer obtains a very limited share of total pro…ts, thereby investing almost nothing in quality improvements. Since the cost of quality improvements increases very slowly close to the origin, a rise in substitutability triggers a steep increase in quality. The consequent increase of aggregate pro…ts dominates the deterioration of the retailers'bargaining position.
Moving to the supply rivalry channel, we have to point out that, for given quality X, parameter k exerts two e¤ects. First, parameter k is inversely related to retailers "congestion" when they compete for the productive resources of the supplier; this represents a source of rivalry on the supply side, hence an increase in k reduces the share of total (gross) pro…ts accruing to the producer, P . Second, parameter k also a¤ects total gross pro…ts (and consumer surplus and total welfare as well), by a¤ecting the slope of the marginal cost curve, entailing an e¢ ciency e¤ect: when k increases total (gross) pro…ts e become larger. Since the producer gross pro…ts are P e , an increase in parameter k generates con ‡icting e¤ects on the quality choice. When the e¢ ciency e¤ect dominates, quality is increasing in k. This occurs when the demand rivalry channel is su¢ ciently important ( high enough), or when demand rivalry is poor ( low) and k is low. In the former case, the producer appropriates a relatively high share of total gross surplus (through the demand rivalry channel) even for large k; hence the negative impact of k on its bargaining power is relatively low. In the latter case, the strong bargaining position of the producer is sustained by the supply channel (k low). Moreover, with very steep marginal costs, total output is low, and ‡atter marginal costs, inducing an output expansion, generate a relevant increase in total gross pro…ts. Hence, the e¢ ciency e¤ect comes out to be very strong. The positive e¤ect of k on quality translates into a similar e¤ect on consumers' surplus and producer's and retailers' pro…ts. Consumers bene…t from both the increase in quality and the reduction in prices induced by ‡atter marginal costs; retailers'pro…ts increase through the improvement in their bargaining position and a higher total surplus e ; …nally, the producer is better o¤, although its bargaining position deteriorates, due to the strong increase in total gross pro…ts e .
When the producer's bargaining position is weak (low and high k) this effect prevails over the e¢ ciency e¤ect, and an increase in k reduces quality and producer's pro…ts. The e¤ects on the other agents are mixed, because the reduced quality lowers surplus, but the ‡atter marginal costs increase it. Hence, non monotonic e¤ects occur. This is summarized by Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 (Impact of supply-side rivalry) (1) When p 2, or < p 2 and k is su¢ ciently low, the equilibrium quality, consumers surplus, total pro…ts, retailers'pro…ts, producer pro…ts and total welfare are increasing in k; (2) When < p 2 and k is su¢ ciently large the equilibrium quality and producer pro…ts are decreasing in k.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Discussion and extensions
We have proved that retailers'rivalry in the bargaining stage in ‡uences the producer incentives to invest in quality, when product improvements entail sunk costs. This instance of the hold-up problem comes out to be quite robust to di¤erent variations of the basic model, that are discussed at length in Battigalli, Fumagalli and Polo (2006). Here we brie ‡y review these extensions.
When higher quality is achieved through more expensive inputs, thereby affecting variable rather than sunk costs, we still obtain that an increase in demand rivalry (higher ) has a positive e¤ect on quality, producer's and consumers'surplus. 16 Similarly to Proposition 2, point (3), retailers'pro…ts initially increase and then decrease in . We have also considered the case of upstream competition, assuming that two producers serve the two retailers. In this more complex setting, we have approximated an increase in (supply) rivalry by comparing a downstream monopoly market with the case of two retailers active in separate markets but served under diseconomies of scale by the producers. We prove that in this latter case the quality chosen by at least one of the producers increases.
Finally, in Appendix B we consider the endogenous choice of k by the producer, adding process innovation to product quality improvements. The hold-up problem is now extended to the decision on the steepness of the marginal cost curve, since the whole cost of k is borne by the producer while the e¢ ciency e¤ect on total gross surplus is shared with the retailers. On top of this, the producer further reduces k to enhance its bargaining position with the retailers. Hence, we obtain sub-optimal investments in both X and k. It turns out that these two stratregic variables are complements: in a neighbourhood of the equilibrium, ‡atter marginal costs entail stronger incentives to raise quality and higher quality entails stronger incentives to improve productive e¢ ciency. This implies that lower buyer power (higher ), by alleviating distortions, is associated to more intense product and process innovation.
Long-Term Relationship between Producer and Retailer
So far we did not take into account the possibility to mitigate the hold-up problem by means of self-enforcing agreements within a long-term relationship. In this section we analyze this issue in the case where the hold-up problem is most severe. In the benchmark model this occurs when rivalry is completely absent ( = 0 and k = 1). The same outcome obtains in the case of a consolidated downstream segment, that we consider here for simplicity.
We adapt and apply a rather general result about the multiplicity of equilibria in repeated agency games 17 to show that repeated interaction can provide appropriate incentives for ex ante non contractible investments.
We consider a dynamic game where …rst a producer P makes a non contractible quality choice X X 0 , incurring a sunk cost I(X X 0 ), and then it interacts repeatedly with a retailer D. 18 Once X is …xed, in each period D makes a takeit-or-leave-it o¤er to P that, upon acceptance, chooses quantity. The maximum one-period surplus (gross of sunk costs) is denoted e (X). The game has in…nite horizon and discount factor which comprises a …xed conditional probability of termination of the relationship. Thus, letting i (t; X) denote the ‡ow payo¤ of player i at time t given X, the (expected) present discounted values for P and D are, respectively,
. 17 The techniques are borrowed from Battigalli and Maggi (2004) . 18 Our results also hold with more than one retailer. We consider only one retailer for the sake of simplicity.
We assume that (i) e ( ) and I( ) are increasing and continuous, I(0) = 0, and (iii) the e¢ cient quality choice exists and is unique:
We …rst show that, if the discount factor is high enough, for every quality choice X there is a multiplicity of equilibria of the ensuing in…nitely repeated game, which allows to support any division of the surplus. Since the repeated game equilibrium (and the associated allocation) can be selected as a function of X, it is then easy to show that it is possible to induce the e¢ cient quality choice X as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome.
, any division of the (gross) surplus e (X) can be supported by a subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated sequential game that obtains after the quality choice stage.
Proof. See Appendix C. The intuition is as follows. Suppose the players want to implement an e¢ cient allocation ( P (X); D (X)) in each period. This can be achieved by adapting to our sequential setting the "optimal-penal-code" approach of Abreu (1986): 19 whenever a …rm deviates from the equilibrium path, or from a punishment path, it triggers an equilibrium punishment phase where it receives its maxmin payo¤. The producer is punished by playing the (backward induction) equilibrium of the stage game, where P = 0. Punishing the deviating retailer is more di¢ cult. Indeed, D's maxmin punishment entails rejection by P of any o¤er that does not allocate all the surplus e (X) to P . But with high discounting ( small) P would also accept o¤ers that give it a small share of the surplus. Suppose that D o¤ers a share e (X) " to P . According to the equilibrium strategies P should reject, yielding zero pro…ts (to both players) in the current period, but making P receive the whole surplus e (X) in all future periods. On the other hand, if P accepts it will be punished from the next period. Therefore P rejects only if 1 e (X) e (X) ", where " can be arbitrarily small. This explains the condition , for all D 2 h 0; e (X ) 1 I(X X 0 ) there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium of the whole game implementing the e¢ cient quality choice X and such that the retailer's istantaneous pro…t is D .
Proof. By Lemma 1, for each X and P 2 [0; e (X)] there is an equilibrium of the repeated game such that the gross istantaneous pro…t of P is P and the istantaneous pro…t of D is D = e (X) P 0. Therefore it is possible to implement in equilibrium the following istantaneous gross pro…t function for P :
Then, in period 0, P chooses quality to solve the problem
, by continuity in a neighborhood of X the net (long-run average) payo¤ of P is
This implies that X is the global maximum. We may interpret Proposition 4 as follows. Producer and retailer realize that they can use the multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibria of the repeated game to enforce agreements that maximize the present value of the surplus. How the gains from trade are split depends on the "bargaining power" of the parties before the producer sinks quality-improving investments. Proposition 4 shows that a large set of distributions of the long-run surplus are consistent with implementing the e¢ cient quality choice. The producer can guarantee a non-negative payo¤ by not investing in quality improvements. This implies a "participation constraint" that bounds from above the share of the retailer.
Proposition 4 shows that the hold-up problem can be solved via qualitydependent equilibrium selection, and it is possible to implement the e¢ cient quality choice in subgame perfect equilibrium. We also note that, if one is willing to give up coalition-proofness, the multiplicity result of Proposition 1 (2) can be used to mitigate the hold-up problem in a static setting, by letting the continuation equilibrium depend on the quality choice. However, by Proposition 1 (1) the upper bound on the producer's gross surplus in subgame perfect equilibrium is (X) e (X), it may be impossible to implement the e¢ cient qualitity choice. In particular, the e¢ cient quality choice of the static model, X = arg max X 0 0 e (X) I(X X 0 ), is not implementable in subgame perfect equilibrium if (X ) I(X X 0 ) < 0, because in this case the producer is better o¤ choosing X 0 rather than X .
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have analyzed the producer-retailers relationship and the e¤ects of buyer power on the incentives of a producer to invest in quality improvements. Buyer power of the retailers has been modelled as depending on fundamentals about technology and preferences that a¤ect retailers'rivalry when dealing with the upstream supplier, namely the degree of substitutability of retailers'o¤ers and the steepness of the marginal cost curve of the producer.
Contrary to most of the literature on this issue we did not adopt a cooperative solution to analyze the negotiation of retailers and producers; rather, we explicitly model a bargaining protocol in a non-cooperative setting. The retailers make simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to the producer proposing a contract, with no a priori restrictions on its form. Coalition-proof equilibrium contracts always entail the implementation of the e¢ cient outcome, i.e. the one that would arise in case of a consolidated vertical chain. Moreover, in equilibrium each retailer appropriates a fraction of total industry pro…ts corresponding to its marginal contribution to total surplus, that is the increase in industry pro…ts when one more retailer is supplied.
The pro…ts left to the producer are an increasing function of the rivalry between retailers. We consider a demand and a supply channel that in ‡uence retailers' rivalry. On the demand side, retailers'substitutability is the key parameter. Each retailer contributes more to total pro…ts the more di¤erentiated it is with respect to the other, while in the case of perfectly homogeneous supplies each one can replace the other and demand rivalry is most intense. In this case all the surplus goes to the producer.
This result provides a new insight on the e¤ect of private labels, i.e. products sold under a retailer's own brand. It is well recognized that the o¤er of private labels makes a retailer a stronger bargainer when negotiating with a major supplier (national brand producer) by reducing the cost of delisting the national brand. We identify a di¤erent channel through which private labels a¤ect this negotiation. A speci…c feature of private labels is that each retailer has exclusive right over the own product. As a result, the introduction of private labels contributes to di¤erentiate rival retail chains, thereby increasing their marginal contribution and improving their bargaining position with respect to the national brands'manufacturers.
The supply channel, instead, works through decreasing returns in production, that in a sense make the two retailers competing for a scarce input at the production stage. The steeper the marginal costs curve, the lower the marginal contribution of each retailer to total surplus, because an expansion of a retailer increases the marginal cost for supplying the other, reducing industry pro…ts. More intense supply rivalry, again, leads to a higher share of surplus left to the producer.
Once highlighted the features of negotiation on the formation and distribution of industry pro…ts, we consider the e¤ects on the incentives of the producer to invest in quality improvement. Since in our setting quality is non contractible, the interaction of retailers and producer is open to the hold-up problem. In fact, the incentive to initially invest in quality improvements depends on the fraction of total pro…ts that in equilibrium is left to the producer.
We identify conditions under which an increase in rivalry, by boosting quality improvements and industry pro…ts, bene…ts not only consumers and the producer, that gets a larger fraction of pro…ts, but also the retailers, that receive a smaller slice of a much bigger cake. Recall that, for given quality,the equilibrium allocation is the one that would obtain under vertical integration. Hence, more rivalry between retailers does not lead to lower …nal prices, but makes industry pro…ts higher and consumers better o¤ through an increase in the quality of the good due to a minitgation of the hold-up problem.
These results are robust to di¤erent ways in which quality can be increased, through sunk investment in R&D or advertising as in our benchmark model, as well as through more valuable intermediate inputs that a¤ect marginal costs. Further, they extend to the case where the producer decides not only on product quality but also on process innovation that makes the marginal cost curve ‡atter. Lower buyer power (more intense rivalry) alleviates the hold-up problem and leads to an improvement in both choices.
A Omitted Proofs
Proposition 2.
Proof. Let us denote as X ( ; k) the equilibrium level of quality, function of the parameters and k; we use a similar notation for the other equilibrium values such as CS ( ; k), e ( ; k) etc. From (9) it is easy to show that
< 0 in a neighborhood of the optimal level of quality and
By inspection of (9), lim !0;k!1 X ( ) = X 0 : when k ! 1 there exists no supply-side rivalry between retailers as marginal costs of production tend to be constant. When ! 0; there exists no demand-side rivalry either. Hence, the producer's share of total surplus is zero and it has no incentive to improve quality. Consequently, when > 2; lim !0;k!1 @X ( ;k) @ = +1: From (5), in equilibrium consumer surplus is given by:
It is easy to show that:
By (6), it follow immediately that in equilibrium
By the envelope theorem and
Since the net producer pro…ts, the gross pro…ts of the vertical chain and consumers'surplus are increasing in ; in equilibrium also total welfare is increasing in : Finally, by (8) ,
From lim !0;k!1
Hence, retailers' pro…ts are increasing in when rivalry is very weak ( small and k large). Moreover, lim !1 D i = 0; that is, when (demand) rivalry is very intense retailers'pro…ts decrease and tend to vanish. Therefore, when k is large, retailers'pro…ts are non monotonic in .
Proposition 3. Proof. From (9),
When p 2; the numerator is positive. When < p 2; the numerator is negative for k large enough. When @X @k > 0; it immediately follows that:
@ e (X) @X @X @k e @a P @k # > 0
In the latter case, recall that @a P @k < 0: Di¤erently stated, when k increases not only total pro…ts increase, but also the share appropriated by retailers. Hence the latters'pro…ts cannot but increase.
By the envelope theorem, @ P @k = @a P @k e + P @ e (k) @k > 0: Since, when quality in increasing in k, the net producer pro…ts, total gross pro…ts and consumers surplus are increasing in k, also total welfare is increasing in k:
Proof. Fix a division of the surplus ( P (X); D (X)) (with P (X)+ D (X) = e (X)). We construct equilibrium strategies such that in every period D o¤ers a contract implementing ( P (X); D (X)) and P accepts. Strategies are represented as automata 20 with three states: the normal state N , the producer's punishment state P, and the retailer's punishment state D. Roughly speaking, in state N players play subgame perfect equilibrium strategies that implement ( P (X); D (X)); in state P players play strategies implementing the lowest subgame perfect equilibrium payo¤ for P ; similarly, in state D player play strategies implementing the minimum subgame perfect equilibrium payo¤ for D. Play starts in the normal state N and, from any state, play switches to the state punishing deviator i as soon as i has deviated. To obtain the minimum subgame perfect equilibrium payo¤s, …rst note that the mere repetition of a stage game (subgame perfect) equilibrium is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the whole game. Since in every stage-game equilibrium D gets the whole surplus, the minimum equilibrium payo¤ of P (gross of sunk costs) is the maxmin, i.e. zero, independently of . We now show that if 1 2 also the minimum equilibrium payo¤ of D is his maxmin (zero), even though D makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er in the stage game.
Consider the following strategies: D starts o¤ering the whole surplus to P , P accepts an o¤er if and only if he is o¤ered the whole surplus. If P deviates (accepting a lower, but still positive o¤er), from the following period D and P play the in…nite repetition of a stage game equilibrium. If P does not deviate, they keep playing as speci…ed above. We verify that there are no incentives to make one-shot deviations. D is indi¤erent, because under the stated continuation strategies any o¤ers yields a zero continuation payo¤. Let us consider P 's incentives. If he is o¤ered P < e (X), an o¤er he is supposed to reject, and he accepts, he obtains P in the current period, but the stated continuation strategies imply that he gets zero in the following periods. Therefore acceptance yields continuation payo¤ P . On the other hand, according to the continuation strategies rejection yields continuation payo¤ 1 e (X). Since P < e (X), P < 1 e (X) for all 1 2 . 20 See, for example, Osborne and Rubinstein (1990).
We now describe the overall strategies with the following Taking into account the argument above, it can be veri…ed that no player can pro…t from one-shot deviations. By the one-shot-deviation principle these strategies form a subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated game.
B Endogenous choice of k
This Appendix solves for the optimal level of product innovation (X ( )) and process innovation (k ( )). We assume that process innovation entails a unit sunk cost r > 0. Hence, the producer solves the following program:
The FOCs are given by:
= X k (2k + 1) + 2k + 1 (4k + + 2k + 1) (X X 0 ) 1 = 0 @ P @k = P @ e (X; k) @k + e @ P @k r = 0 Inspection of (15) reveals that the producer chooses a lower level of k (compared to the one that maximizes total pro…ts) not only because it does not appropriate entirely the bene…t of an increase in k but also because by decreasing k it increases its share of total gross surplus (recall that @ P =@k < 0). From (14), one obtains the optimal level of quality for given k; denoted as X(k): Similarly, from (15), one obtains the optimal level of process innovation for given X; denoted as k(X): The solution of the program above is given by the intersection of the two functions. Note that dk(X) dX =
